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Post-Accident Repairs and Offers of Compromise:
Shaping Exclusionary Rules to Public Policy
INTRODUCTION

It is generally believed that the trier of fact should be provided
with as much evidence as possible to ensure that it is aware of all
the facts necessary to make a proper determination of the issues it
must decide.' Certain forms of evidence, however, are excluded from
the trier of fact either because they are immaterial2 or irrelevant, '
or because admitting the evidence is considered contrary to certain
policy objectives.' At one time, evidence of post-accident repairs5
and offers of compromise6 was excluded on relevancy grounds. It is
I.

See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBERG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 140 (1977); J.
A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264 (1898).
2. Evidence which does not address an issue which is in dispute is excluded as being
immaterial. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 235 Ill. 135, 85 N.E. 312 (1908); Batavia
Mfg. Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 Ill.
230 (1878); Ferdinand v. Yellow Cab Co., 42 Il.App.
3d 91, 355 N.E.2d 547 (1976); Lemaster v. Burns, 130 Ill. App. 2d 918, 266 N.E.2d 114 (1971).
3. Evidence which does not logically tend to prove or disprove a disputed issue is excluded
as being irrelevant. See, e.g., Marut v. Costello, 34 Il. 2d 125, 214 N.E.2d 768 (1966); People
v. Scott, 29 Ill.2d 97, 193 N.E.2d 814 (1963); Maltby v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 347 Il.App. 441,
106 N.E.2d 879 (1952).
4. Consider, for example, the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, and
the interspousal privilege, all of which were developed to serve policy objectives. For a complete discussion of these exclusions see Note, Privilegesfor Confidential Communication, 10
Loy. CHI. L.J.
- (1979) (attorney-client and interspousal); Note, The Psychiatrist-Patient
Privilege in Illinois, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. (1979).
5. The justification for excluding evidence of post-accident repairs is rarely discussed. In
Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill.
53, 23 N.E. 423 (1890), however, the exclusion was justified on
policy and relevancy grounds. The court stated that repair evidence is irrelevant to the issue
of negligence, since the implementation of repairs would not "necessarily imply" that prior
measures had been unreasonable. Id. at 56, 23 N.E. at 424. The court's analysis was based
on the theory of legal relevancy, under which circumstantial evidence was considered irrelevent unless it had more than a logical connection to the issue for which it was offered. See
generally Slough, Relevancy Unravelled, 5 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1956). This theory of
relevancy has been rejected by Illinois courts. See, e.g., Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill.
2d 125, 128,
214 N.E.2d 768, 769 (1966); People v. Newsome, 291 Ill. 11, 20, 125 N.E. 735, 739 (1919).
Evidence is now considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the proposition for which
it is offereq more or less likely to be true. Id. The implementation of repairs may often
indicate that the repairing party has recognized the insufficiency of prior measures, especially
when repairs are effected shortly after an accident. Consequently, it has been widely recognized that the exclusion is no longer justified under the modern concept of relevancy. See,
e.g., E. CLEARY et. al., MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275 at 663 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK (2d ed.)]; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE § 417[021, 407-9 [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
6. As in the case of post-accident repairs, the early decisions dealing with offers of compromise excluded the evidence as being legally irrelevant to the issue of liability: the offer was
viewed merely as an attempt to buy peace. See, e.g., Paulin v. Howser, 63 II. 312 (1872);
THAYER,
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now generally believed, however, that the exclusion of such evidence
is attributable to policy considerations. 7
This article will examine the Illinois rules excluding evidence of
post-accident repairs and offers of compromise. It will evaluate the
rules in light of the policy considerations they purportedly promote.
Finally, it will identify the shortcomings of each rule and suggest
alternative methods of dealing with the evidence.
POST-ACCIDENT REPAIRS

Current Law
Illinois, like the majority of jurisdictions s excludes evidence of
post-accident repairs' when it is offered as circumstantial proof of
City of Peru v. French, 55 11. 317 (1870). It has been noted, however, that the inference of
liability increases with the amount of the offer, MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 5, § 274 at
663, and, consequently, under the modem theory of relevancy, the exclusion is not justified
on relevancy grounds. Bell, Admissions Arising out of Compromise-Are They Irrelevant?,
31 TEx. L. REV. 239, 251-52 [hereinafter cited as Bell]; MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 5,
at 663.
7. The repair rule is usually attributed to the policy of encouraging repairs. See notes 11
and 12, infra. See also MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 5, § 275, at 668; 2 WEINSTEiN, supra
note 5, § 407[02] at 407-9. The compromise rule is attributed to the policy of encouraging
out-of-court settlements. See notes 50-52, infra. See also Bell, supra note 6, at 251-52;
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 5, § 274 at 663; FED. R. EVID. 408, Advisory Comm. Notes.
Indeed, because of the policy bases of the rules, McCormick believes they should be characterized as privileges. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 5, § 74 at 153-54.
8. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1968); NEW JERSEY EvID. R.
51 (1976). See also Annots., 170 A.L.R. 1 (1947), 64 A.L.R. 2d 1283 (1959). Kansas admitted
repair evidence under common law but adopted the exclusionary rule when it codified its rules
of evidence. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-451 (1965). South Dakota appears to be the only state
which currently admits repair evidence under a common law rule. See Note, Admissibility
of Change of Condition or Repair After Injury as Evidence of Negligence 15 S. DAK. L. REV.
287 (1970). Maine, however, admits the evidence under an express statutory provision. See
ME. R. EvID. 407(a) (Supp. 1975), reproduced in note 42, infra. See also Note, The Repair
Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negligence, 27 ME. L. Rv.225 (1975).
9. The term "repairs" has been broadly defined to encompass a variety of remedial meaApp. 2d 167, 185 N.E.2d
sures, including changes in instructions, Dittmar v. Ahem, 37 Ill.
264 (1962), and operations, Parnham v. Carl W. Linder Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 224, 183 N.E.2d
744 (1962), as well as the addition of warnings, American State Bank v. County of Woodford,
App. 2d
55 I1. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 232 (1978); Herrington v. Illinois Power Co., 79 Ill.
431, 223 N.E.2d 729 (1967), or safety devices, Spurr v. LaSalle Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 322 (7th.
Cir. 1967); Marder, Luce & Co. v. Leary, 137 ll. 319, 26 N.E. 1093 (1891); Hodges v. Percival,
53, 23 N.E. 423 (1890). It also has been interpreted as including precautionary mea132 Ill.
sures such as placing a watchman at a railroad crossing following an accident. Village of
Mount Morris v. Kanode, 98 1l1. App. 373 (1901); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R.R. v. Doerr, 41
Ill. App. 530 (1891). Other jurisdictions have recently dealt with the question of whether a
manufacturer's recall letter could come within the ambit of the rule. It generally is held that
they do, but such letters are admitted so long as there is other evidence which indicates that
the accident was related to the defect addressed in the letter. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 1220
(1978).
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negligence.' 0 The exclusionary rule is based on the policy of encouraging individuals to make repairs which might prevent future injuries." It is believed that admitting such evidence would frustrate
this policy because the implementation of repairs could be interpreted as an admission of prior negligence.' 2 Consequently, repair
evidence is excluded when offered to prove fault, provided the repairs were made to the defendant's own property. 3
Despite this salutory purpose, evidence of repairs may reach the
trier of fact in a variety of ways. When repairs are made by someone other than the defendant, the policy considerations favoring
exclusion are considered inapplicable and the repairs may be used
to prove that the defendant was negligent in failing to make the
repairs himself." Admission is allowed in this situation even if the
repairing party is joined as a co-defendant. 5 Repairs may also be
used to rebut other evidence'" or to explain conditions which existed
at the time the plaintiff was injured.' 7 For example, in Chicago, P.
& St. L. Ry. v. Lewis,'s the plaintiff was permitted to show that the
defendant railroad had removed and replaced rotten ties following
the derailment which caused the plaintiff's injuries. The court indi10. See, e.g., Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill. 53, 23 N.E. 423 (1890); Dallas v. Granite City
Steel Co., 64 Il. App. 2d 409, 211 N.E.2d 907 (1965); Day v Barber-Coleman Co., 10 Ill. App.
2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956); Garshon v. Aaron, 330 Ill. App. 540, 71 N.E.2d 799 (1947). It
is interesting to note that Illinois initially admitted repair evidence when offered to prove
negligence. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272 (1871); City of Vandalia v. Ropp, 39
Ill. App. 344 (1891); Ohio & M. Ry. v. Cox, 26 Ill. App. 491 (1887). However, the exclusionary
rule became well established following the Hodges decision.
11. See notes 5 and 7, supra, and note 12, infra.
12. In establishing the exclusionary rule, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill. 53, 23 N.E. 423 (1890), pointed out that:
Evidence of precautions taken after an accident is apt to be interpreted by a jury
as an admission of negligence. . . . [lit would seem unjust that [defendant]
could not take additional precautions after the accident without having his acts
construed into an admission of prior negligence. Persons, to whose negligence accidents may be attributed, will hesitate about adopting such changes as will prevent
the recurrence of similar accidents ...
Id. at 56, 23 N.E. at 424.
13. The exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable where repairs were made to another
person's property. Plaza Express Co. v. Middle States Motor Freight, Inc., 40 Ill. App. 2d
117, 189 N.E.2d 382 (1963).
14. Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974); Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee,
Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
15. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
16. Sample v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 233 Ill. 564, 84 N.E. 643 (1908); Kath v. East St.
L.&S. & Ry., 232 Ill. 126, 83 N.E. 533 (1907); City of Taylorville v. Stafford, 196 Ill. 288, 63
N.E. 624 (1902); Garshon v. Aaron, 330 Ill. App. 540, 71 N.E.2d 799 (1947).
17. Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. v. Lewis, 145 Ill. 67, 33 N.E. 960 (1893); City of Chicago v.
Dalle, 115 Il. 386 (1885).
18. 145 I1. 67, 33 N.E. 960 (1893).
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cated that such evidence was competent to establish the condition
of the track at the time of the accident, and to rebut any inference
that the tracks had not been changed prior to the trial. 9
Although evidence of repairs is generally excluded when offered
to prove negligence, it may be used to establish certain elements of
a negligence action. The defendant's duty to exercise reasonable
care may be proven through repairs indicating his control0 or ownership2 ' of the property which caused the plaintiff's injuries. If this
duty has already been established, a breach of the duty may be
shown by comparing the cost of the repairs to the risk created by
the prior condition of the property.2 In addition, evidence of repairs
may be used to establish causation-in-fact. 23 For example, where a
plaintiff alleged that certain damage to his property had been
caused by emissions from a neighboring roundhouse, he was permitted to show that damages ceased after the smokestacks on the
24
roundhouse were raised.
Evidence of post-accident design changes is admissible in strict
products liability actions to prove that the defendant's product was
defectively designed because of his failure to incorporate feasible
safety devices.2 Illinois courts initially refused to admit such evidence because the feasibility of alternative designs was not considered relevant in determining a manufacturer's liability. 2 Following
the adoption and expansion of strict liability theory,2 7 the feasibility
19. Id. at 78, 33 N.E. at 963.
20. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 I1. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965); Murphy v. Illinois State Trust
Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E.2d 305 (1940).
21. Campagna v. Cozzi, 59 I1. App. 2d 208, 207 N.E.2d 739 (1965); Garshon v. Aaron,
330 I1. App. 540, 71 N.E.2d 799 (1947); Kellems v. Schiele, 297 Ill. App. 388, 17 N.E.2d 604
(1938).
22. Dallas v. Granite City Steel Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 409, 211 N.E.2d 907 (1965).
23. Kuhn v. Illinois C. R.R., 111 Ill. App. 323 (1903).
24. Id.
25. Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 58 I11.App. 3d 791, 374 N.E.2d 858 (1978); Gaenzele v.
B. E. Wallace Prod. Corp., 39 Ill. App. 3d 93, 350 N.E.2d 571 (1976); Biehler v. White Metal
Rolling & Stamping Corp., 30 111. App. 3d 435, 333 N.E.2d 716 (1975); Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972). This is consistent with the majority
rule. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1001 (1976). For a general discussion see Hafele, Evidence in
ProductsLiability Cases: Proofof Post-InjuryAlterations:A Proposal,60 ILL. B. J. 936 (1972);
Note, Products Liability-Subsequent Remedial Measures-Evidence of Subsequent
Changes in Design is Admissible in a Strict Liability Suit, 44 CINN. L. REv. 637 (1975); Note,
Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE L.J. 837 (1972).
26. Day v. Barber-Coleman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
27. Illinois adopted strict liability theory in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Subsequent decisions have expanded the theory. See, e.g., Williams
v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.
App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
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of alternative designs became recognized as a relevant consideration,"' and post-accident design changes were admitted when addressed to this issue. 29 There is even some indication that design
changes may be admissible to prove feasibility in products liability
actions based solely on negligence.3 0 Nevertheless, because a jury
might confuse the issues of feasibility and negligence, post-accident
feasibility in actions
changes are excluded when offered to prove
3
lying outside the area of products liability. '
Illinois courts have failed to explain why there should be so many
permissible uses of repair evidence. Apparently, when the evidence
is admitted its probative value is thought to be sufficient to outweigh any threat to the policy of encouraging repairs. However,
some of the "exceptions" present no threat to that policy. Admitting
post-accident design changes in products liability actions does not
discourage repairs, since a variety of factors compel a manufacturer
to improve a defective product, regardless of the admissibility of
repair evidence. 32 Admitting repairs made by someone other than
the defendant may actually promote repairs by encouraging a po28. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 I1. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
29. Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 791, 374 N.E.2d 858 (1978); Gaenzele v.
App. 3d 93, 350 N.E.2d 571 (1976); Biehler v. White Metal
B. E. Wallace Prod. Corp., 39 Ill.
Rolling & Stamping Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 435, 333 N.E.2d 716 (1975); Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
30. In Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972),
the court noted that:
In the development of product's liability principles design alternatives are appropriately considered whether reasonable care is the basis of liability or where liability
is predicated upon strict tort liability. . . .In both cases it appears that policy
considerations are involved which shift the emphasis from the defendant manufacturer's conduct to the charactter of the product. Such change in emphasis furnishes
additional reasons for permitting evidence of alternative designs in a strict tort
liability case. . . .If the feasibility of designs may be shown by the opinions of
experts or by the existence safety devices on other products . . .we conclude that
evidence of a post occurrence change is equally relevant and material in determining that a design alternative is feasible.
Id. at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753. The feasibility of alternative designs has been recognized as
relevant in determining whether a defendant was negligent, Moren v. Samuel M. Langston
Co., 96 111. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968), and evidence of post-accident design changes
has been admitted in one case pleading counts of negligence and strict liability. Moore v.
App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Il1. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d
Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.
103 (1970).
31. American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 232
(1978).
32. If the manufacturer does not effect repairs, he subjects himself to the possibility of
extensive litigation, unfavorable publicity, and actions for non-compliance with various administrative regulations, all of which could amount to substantial economic losses. See Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE L. REv.
528 (1971).
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tential defendant to promptly repair his property so as to qualify for
3
the exclusionary rule's protection.
Nevertheless, the other "exceptions" to the exclusionary rule
present a danger that the evidence will be interpreted as an admission of prior negligence. Because of this danger, repair evidence is
admitted only when the plaintiff has no other means of addressing
a disputed issue. 31 If the evidence is received, the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction informing the jury to consider the
5
repairs only on the issue to which they are properly addressed2
Moreover, the defendant may protect himself in some situations by
admitting the issue the repairs are offered to prove. Admission takes
3
the issue out of dispute and renders the evidence inadmissible.
Admitting evidence of post-accident repairs still presents a danger of jury misuse despite the protective measures which are available to the defendant. Whenever the evidence is admitted, a jury
might ignore the limiting instruction and construe the repairs as an
admission of prior negligence. By recognizing many permissible uses
of repair evidence, Illinois courts have weakened the rule and prevented effective implementation of the policy which engendered it.
It is therefore advisable to examine alternative ways of dealing with
evidence of post-accident repairs.
Alternatives
There are two alternative methods of dealing with repair evidence. First, the exclusionary rule could be expanded so that repairs
would rarely reach the trier of fact. If the exclusionary rule actually
promotes repairs, expansion would be desirable. However, it would
deprive the trier of fact of evidence which, in many situations, is
relevant to the determination of a disputed issue. This directly contravenes the basic evidentiary policy of placing all relevant information before the trier of fact. Instead of using a broad rule of exclu33. Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837,
843 (1972). The admission of third party repairs may erode the protection afforded to the
repairing party. Id.
34. Schuman v. Bader & Co., 227 Ill. App. 28 (1922).
35. Evidence which is admissible on one ground but inadmissible on another is always
received subject to a limiting instruction. Mighell v. Stone, 175 Ill. 261, 51 N.E. 906 (1898);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Clark, 108 11. 113 (1883); Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263,
132 N.E.2d 788 (1956).
36. Evidence which does not address an issue in dispute is excluded as being immaterial.
See note 2, supra. Consequently, if the plaintiff offers evidence of repairs to establish the
defendant's ownership of the property which caused the plaintiffs injuries, the defendant
might admit his ownership and preclude introduction of the repairs. This tactic is discussed
in Kennelly, Post-Accident Remedial Measures (Federal Rule of Evidence 407)-Suggested
Discovery and Methods to Establish Admissibility, 21 TR. L. GUIDE 61 (1977).
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sion, courts should be permitted to balance the probative value of
repair evidence against the potential harm which would result from
its admission. They appear to have done this already in formulating
the many "exceptions" which are recognized under current law.
Consequently, an expansion of the rule would not be desirable.
A second alternative would be to completely eliminate the exclusionary rule. The rule is based on the assumption that remedial
measures would not be taken if repair evidence were admitted at
trial. This assumption ignores a number of reasons why repairs
might be made despite the admissibility of repair evidence. For
example, the defendant may wish to make the property safe for his
own use.3 71 Repairs might also be made in recognition of the fact that
a failure to implement remedial measures could be used to prove
negligence if a second person were injured at a later time. 38 In addition, the existence of liability insurance suggests that repairs would
continue to be made in the absence of the exclusionary rule.39 The
rule protects a defendant from liability by excluding repair evidence. Insurance serves the same function by shifting the risk of
liability from the defendant to the insurer. Consequently, the insured defendant need not hesitate to repair even if this could be
used against him at trial. In fact, most insurance carriers require
repairs to be made as a condition of continued coverage. 4° In light
of these considerations, and the fact that most persons are unaware
of the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule,4 it would appear
that the assumption underlying the rule is unfounded and the rule
itself is unnecessary to insure that individuals will make postaccident repairs. The rule should be eliminated.
If the rule were eliminated, as it has been in Maine,4" the admissi37. Note, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL.
D. L. REV. 421, 434 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Il. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd,
46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d. 103 (1970).
39. Note, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL.
D. L. REV. 421, 433 (1977).
40. Id.
41. Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair,
7 FORuM 1, 6 (1971).
42. In codifying its rules of evidence, Maine abandoned the common-law exclusionary rule
and replaced it with a rule of admission. ME. R. EviD. 407(a) (Supp. 1975) states:
"(a) Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is admissible." The Advisor's Note indicates the reason for the change: "The public
policy behind the rule against admissibility was that it would deter repairs. This rationale is
unpersuasive today."
In recognition of the problem created by recall letters, see note 9, supra, Maine established
ME. R. EVID. 407(b) (Supp. 1975) which provides:
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bility of repair evidence would be governed by the standard evidentiary procedure of balancing its probative value against its potential
prejudicial effect.13 Courts could still protect a defendant from prejudicial uses of repair evidence, but they would be free to admit the
evidence if its probative value outweighed any harm which the defendant might experience. Admitting repair evidence would not
harm a non-negligent defendant, since he would be able to show
that his property was reasonably maintained at the time of the
accident and that his post-accident repairs simply made the property safer." This would dispel any negative inference which might
be drawn from the fact that repairs had been made. On the other
hand, if the defendant had failed to reasonably maintain his property, the plaintiff could show this through repairs made after the
accident. This would further the basic tort policy of awarding damages to persons injured as a result of another's negligent acts. 5 As
presently administered, the exclusionary rule thwarts this policy by
keeping relevant information from the trier of fact and providing an
artificial barrier to recovery from negligent parties."
Notification of Defect:
(b) Notification of defect. A written notification by a manufacturer of any defect
in a product produced by such manufacturer to purchasers thereof is admissible
against the manufacturer on the issue of existence of the defect to the extent that
it is relevant.
A minority of the committee which produced the proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence advocated the elimination of the exclusionary rule because of 1) the many exceptions to the rule;
2) the extensive use of liability insurance; and, 3) the fact that most defendants are unaware
of the rule. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 407, Minority Discussion (Final Draft). Nevertheless, the

majority adopted

PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 407 (Final Draft) which closely parallels FED. R.
EvID. 407 and makes no substantive changes to Illinois common law. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID.

407 states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures or impeachment.
The majority's decision to retain the rule was based upon the belief that the "exclusion of
[repair] evidence serves the social purpose of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discourage them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety." PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID.
407, Majority Discussion (Final Draft).
43. The admissiblity of evidence which is not subject to an exclusionary rule is determined
through this balancing process. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 410 Ill. 469, 102 N.E.2d 529 (1951);
Hulsebus v. Russian, 118 I1. App. 2d 174, 254 N.E.2d 184 (1969).
44. Note, The Repair Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negligence, 27 ME. L. REv. 225, 244 (1975).
45. Note, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL.
D. L. REv. 421, 434 (1977).
46. Illinois courts continue to recognize the defenses of assumption of risk and contribu-
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The exclusionary rule serves no valid purpose. It should be eliminated and courts should be allowed to determine the admissibility
of repair evidence on a case by case basis by balancing its probative
value against its potential prejudicial effect.
OFFERS OF COMPROMISE

Current Law
Compromise evidence, like evidence of repairs, is generally excluded when offered to establish the existence" or extent48 of a
party's liability." The exclusion is based on the policy of encouraging out-of-court settlements. 50 By settling out of court, individuals
avoid the trouble and expense of litigation and the judicial system
is relieved of the burden of trying unnecessary lawsuits." It has been
recognized that a trier of fact might interpret an offer of compromise
as an admission of liability or weakness of position.52 Since this
possibility might discourage individuals from settling, a broad exclusion is applied to offers of compromise.
The exclusion applies to compromise evidence offered by53 or
tory negligence. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
(assumption of risk); Verdonick v. Freeding, 56 Ill. App. 3d 575, 371 N.E.2d 1109 (1977)
(contributory negligence). These defenses allow a defendant to escape liability even if he has
been negligent. The rule excluding post-accident repairs provides the negligent defendant
with yet another means of avoiding liability.
47. See, e.g., Barker v. Bushnell, 75 Ill. 220 (1874); Paulin v. Howser, 63 I1. 312 (1872);
City of Peru v. French, 55 Ill. 317 (1870); People v. Kilbride, 16 Ill. App. 3d 820, 306 N.E.2d
879 (1974).
48. Chicago, E. & L. S. R.R., v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 119 Ill. 525, 10 N.E. 372
(1887); City of Peru v. French, 55 Ill. 317 (1870); Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Ferris,
72 I1. App. 684 (1897).
49. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West 1968); NEw JERsav EVID.
R. 52 (West 1952 & Supp. 1978). See also Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 858 (1952).
50. Ross v. Danter Assoc., 102 I1. App. 2d 354, 242 N.E.2d 330 (1968); Adkins v. Blue
Bird Coach Lines, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 2d 34, 169 N.E.2d 368 (1960); Gehm v. People, 87 I1.
App. 158 (1899). This policy also serves as the primary basis for Federal Rule of Evidence
408. FED. R. EVID. 408, Advisory Comm. Notes. For a discussion of the various other justifications which have been used in other jurisdictions see Bell, supra note 6, at 251-52.
51. Bell, supra note 6, at 252.
52. In Gehm v. People, 87 Ill. App. 158 (1899), it was noted that:
A mere unaccepted offer to pay a sum in compromise of a suit or claim is not
admissible in evidence against a party, on grounds of public policy. An innocent
party has a right to buy his peace and thus avoid suit. If such an offer could
afterward be given in evidence against the party making it, and used as a tacit
admission of liability, no attempt to compromise a suit would ever be made.
Id. at 159-60.
53. Milhim v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 171 Ill. App. 262 (1912); Barnett v. Noble, 155 Il1. App.
129 (1910); American Ins. Co. v. Walston, 111 Ill. App. 133 (1903); Rollins v. Duffy, 14 Il.
App. 69 (1883).
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against"4 the party who made the settlement attempt. It prohibits
the introduction of evidence relating to third party negotiations " as
well as those conducted between the parties themselves. 6 It may
also exclude evidence of accepted but unperformed offers of compromise. Several early cases implied that such evidence might be admissible,57 apparently because the non-performing party could be
sued for his breach. It has been noted, however, that the determination of admissibility should not be affected by the acceptance of an
offer'" and, as of this date, no court has admitted evidence of an
accepted but unperformed offer of compromise. 9
Many forms of compromise negotiations are excluded under current law, including loan agreements," consent judgments,6 i and
covenants-not-to-sue. 2 At one time, offers to pay" or actual payments"' of an injured party's medical expenses were admitted as
admissions against interest. By admitting such evidence while continuing to exclude offers of compromise, Illinois courts often produced inconsistent results since the admissibility of evidence depended upon whether it was characterized as an attempt to settle
or an offer to pay medical expenses. 5 Recent legislation has eliminated this problem by declaring inadmissible offers to pay or actual
payments of a party's medical expenses." This legislation is particu54. See notes 47-49, supra.
55. Sleck v. Butler Bros., 53 Ill. App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64 (1964); Fenberg v. Rosenthal,
348 Il. App. 510, 109 N.E.2d 402 (1952); Hill v. Hiles, 309 Ill. App. 321, 32 N.E.2d 933 (1941);
Chicago C. Ry. v. Cooney, 95 Ill. App. 471 (1901).
56. See notes 47 and 48, supra.
57. See, e.g., Paulin v. Howser, 63 111. 312 (1872); City of Peru v. French, 55 Ill. 317 (1870).
58. Bell, supra note 6, at 258-59.
59. But see Chicago E. & L. S. R.R. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 119 Ill. 525, 10 N.E.
372 (1887). The facts are unclear but it appears that following the acceptance of a compromise
offer one party reneged. Nevertheless, evidence regarding the offer was excluded.
60. Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); American State
Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 232 (1978).
61. Sleck v. Butler Bros., 53 Ill. App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64 (1964).
62. American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 233
(1978); Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961).
63. Norling v. Carr, 211 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1954); Mick v. Kroger Co., 73 11. App. 2d 155,
218 N.E.2d 654 (1966); Hanlon v. Lindberg, 319 Ill. App. 1, 48 N.E.2d 735 (1943).
64. Sullivan v. Heyer, 300 Ill. App. 599, 21 N.E.2d 776 (1939).
65. Compare Sullivan v. Heyer, 300 Ill. App. 599, 21 N.E.2d 776 (1939) (payments of
medical bills admitted as admission against interest) with Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ill. App.
510, 109 N.E.2d 402 (1952) (payment of medical bills excluded as attempt to compromise).
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 61 (1967) provides:
§ 61. Payment or offer to provide or pay for medical, etc., servicesEffect-Admissibility of evidence
The providing of, or payment for, medical, surgical, hospital, or rehabilitation
services, facilities, or equipment by, or on behalf of any person, or the offer to
provide, or pay for any one or more of the foregoing, shall not be construed as an
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larly important in light of the advance payment programs adopted
by many insurance companies. 7 Nevertheless, payments whichexceed an amount necessary to cover medical expenses are still admissible as an admission against interest. 8
To preserve the intergrity of the exclusionary rule, 9 Illinois courts
consistently exclude compromise evidence when it is offered to establish an issue other than liability. Compromise offers are excluded
when offered to prove an agency relationship between the defendant
and the individual who caused the plaintiffs injuries.7' They are
also excluded when offered to show the amount of a party's damages,7 even when it is alleged that a party failed to mitigate damages by refusing to accept a reasonable offer72 or that the amount of
admission of any liability by such person or persons. Testimony, writings, records,
reports or information with respect to the foregoing shall not be admissible in
evidence as an admission of any liability in any action of any kind in any court or
before any commission, administrative agency, or other tribunal in this State,
except at the instance of the person or persons so making any such provision,
payment or offer.
The statute placed Illinois in line with the majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
409; CALIF. EvID. CODE § 1152 (West 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-452 (1976 & Supp. 1978). See
also Annots., 65 A.L.R.3d 932 (1975); 20 A.L.R.2d 291 (1952).
Federal rule 409 states that evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for
the injury. Under that rule, however, any statement or conduct made in conjunction with an
offer or payment of medical expenses may be admitted because communication is considered
unnecessary "in cases of payments or offers or promises to pay medical expenses." FED. R.
EVID. 409, Advisory Comm. Notes. The Illinois statute appears to provide the paying party
more protection than the federal rule since "[tiestimony, writings, records, reports or
[other] information" relating to an offer or payment of medical expenses is excluded unless
offered by him. ILL. REV. STAT ch. 51, § 61 (1977). Proposed Illinois Rule of Evidence 409 might
have eliminated this additional protection, since it adopted the language of the federal rule.
67. Recognizing the hardship faced by injured plaintiffs during the period between injury
and recovery, insurance companies have instituted advance payment programs through
which plaintiffs are advanced funds to be credited against any sum later recovered against
the insured defendant. For a discussion of such programs, see Carpenter, The Legal Aspects
of PartialPayments Made on Liability Claims in Advance of Final Settlement, 1967 ABA
SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAw PROCEEDINGS 499. See also Annot.,
25 A.L.R.3d 1091 (1969).
68. Flagler v. Wessman, 130 Ill. App.2d 491, 263 N.E.2d 630 (1970).
69. It has been noted that exceptions to the exclusionary rule should not be permitted
since "it is a practical impossibility to eradicate from the'jury's minds the considerations that
where there has been a payment there must have been liability." Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348
Ill. App. 510, 518, 109 N.E.2d 402, 405 (1952).
70. Prewitt v. Hall, 113 Ill. App. 2d 198, 252 N.E.2d 43 (1969); Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348
Ill. App. 510, 109 N.E.2d 402 (1952).
71. Chicago, E. &. L. S. R.R. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 119 Ill. 525, 10 N.E. 372
(1887); City of Peru v. French, 55 Il1. 317 (1870); Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Ferris,
72 Ill. App. 684 (1897).
72. Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977).
In Smiley, an insurance company was sued for an alleged bad faith refusal to settle within
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damages is insufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction.7" Unlike
the majority of jurisdictions," Illinois excludes compromise offers
even when they are used to impeach a witness,75 except in unusual
circumstances where testimony has been procured through fraud or
other questionable means."
Despite the courts' adherence to the general rule of exclusion,
compromise evidence has been received in a handful of situations.
As in the case of repair evidence, there has been no adequate explanation for the "exceptions" to the exclusionary rule. Again, one must
assume that where the evidence has been admitted its probative
value was considered more substantial than its threat to the policy
of encouraging settlements. Thus, letters containing the terms of a
contract upon which a suit was brought have been admitted even
though the letters also contained offers of compromise.7 7 Compromise evidence has also been admitted when used to prove the waiver
of a contract term" or to show that an employee was injured while
acting within the scope of his employment.7 9 Finally, when the defendant has invoked the statute of limitations as a defense, the
plaintiff has been permitted to use compromise evidence to explain
the limits of an insured's policy. The company filed a third-party claim against its attorney
who had allegedly failed to settle, despite the company's order to do so. When the attorney
attempted to show that the company failed to mitigate its damages by refusing to accept a
compromise offer made by the plaintiff, the evidence was excluded on the grounds that "the
rule allowing the admittance of evidence of failure to mitigate damages must yield to the
public policy inherent in the rule that the offers of compromise . . . may not be shown except
in unusual circumstances." Id. at 681, 364 N.E.2d at 688. The court indicated, however, that
the evidence would be admissible in a second trial limited to the issue of damages once the
company's liability had been established. Id. This bifurcated approach is also used to credit
a defendant for any payments which may have been received by the plaintiff. Ross v. Danter
Assoc., 102 II1. App. 2d 354, 242 N.E.2d 330 (1968).
73. Jeffries v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 434 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1970).
74. See FED. R. EVID. 408; CALIF. EvID. CODE §1152 (West 1968); Annot., 161 A.L.R. 395
(1946).
75. Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ill. App. 510, 109 N.E.2d 402 (1952).
76. This limited exception was suggested in Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ill. App. 510, 518,
109 N.E.2d 402, 405 (1952), and it has been applied in two cases involving loan agreements
made between a plaintiff and one of several defendants who agreed to testify on behalf of the
plaintiff. Reese v. Chicago, B. &. Q. R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); American
State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 232 (1978).
77. Scofield v. Parlin & Ordendorff Co., 61 F. 804 (7th Cir. 1894); National Importing &
Trading Co. v. E. A. Bear & Co., 236 Ill. App. 426 (1925), rev'd on other grounds, 324 Ill.
346, 155 N.E. 343 (1927).
78. Bloomington Hotel Co. v. Garthwait, 227 Ill. 613 (1907); Edward Edinger Co. v. Willis,
260 Ill. App. 106 (1931); Downs v. Michigan Com. Ins. Co., 157 Ill. App. 32 (1910).
79. In two recent decisions, Illinois workman's compensation settlement contracts were
admitted when offered for this purpose. Korleski v. Needham, 77 Il1. App. 2d 328, 222 N.E.2d
334 (1966); Bassi v. Morgan, 60 Ill. App. 2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 341 (1965).
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his delay in bringing suit.0 To protect the defendant in this situation, a preliminary trial is held to determine whether the defendant
used compromise negotiations to induce the plaintiff to forsake filing his claim. If it is found that this occurred, a new jury is impanelled and a second trial is held to determine the defendant's liability." Through this arrangement, offers of compromise are kept from
the jury which determines the defendant's liability. Of course,
whenever compromise offers are admitted, the defendant is entitled
to a limiting instruction."
The courts' broad application of the exclusionary rule and their
reluctance to recognize permissible uses of compromise evidence
indicate a clear intent to protect the policy of encouraging out of
court settlements. Courts, however, do not protect independent
statements of fact which are made without recourse during compromise negotiations. "' In other words, if a party expressly 4 or implicitly s5 admits a fact during negotiations, the admission may be used
at trial to prove liability, unless he qualifies the admission as being
made in confidence or without prejudice." Under this rule, repayment negotiations may be used by a creditor to establish a debtor's
liability,"7 even where the parties have never established the amount
actually owed."8 Similarily, payments made before a demand may
be used to show liability"' unless the paying party had reasonable
80. Suing v. Catton, 118 Ill.
App. 2d 468, 254 N.E.2d 806 (1970); Devlin v. Wantroba, 72
Ill. App. 2d 383, 218 N.E.2d 496 (1966); Kinsey v. Thompson, 44 Ill.
App. 2d 304, 194 N.E.2d
565 (1963).
81. Kinsey v. Thompson, 44 IIl. App. 2d 304, 194 N.E.2d 565 (1963).
82. See note 35, supra.
83. Sipes v. Barlow, 197 Ill. App. 239 (1915); Domm v. Hollenbeck, 142 II. App. 439
(1908); Alminowicz v. People, 117 Ill. App. 415 (1904); Miene v. People, 37 I1. App. 589
(1891).
84. Smothers v. Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Co., 264 Il. App. 488 (1932); McMaster-Carr
Supply Co. v. Phoenix Elec. Co., 209 Il1. App. 347 (1918); Stein v. Automatic Elec. Co., 152
Ill. App. 392 (1910).
85. Ross v. Danter Assoc., 102 Il. App. 2d 354, 242 N.E.2d 330 (1968). In Ross the
defendant was sued for his failure to perform a construction contract. A check which had been
sent by the defendant to the plaintiff was admitted as an admission of liability because in
sending the letter the defendant had failed to indicate that it was intended to be a settlement
for his failure to perform.
86. Sipes v. Barlow, 197 I1. App. 239 (1915); Alminowitz v. People, 117 Ill.
App. 415
(1904).
87. Smothers v. Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Co., 264 Il1. App. 488 (1932); McMaster-Carr
Supply Co. v. Phoenix Elec. Co., 209 Il.App. 347 (1918); Stein v. Automatic Elec. Co., 152
Ill. App. 392 (1910).
88. Gaslight Ill. Inc., v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 46 IIl. App. 3d 917, 362 N.E.2d 725 (1977).
89. Morgan v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1973); Maulding v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 168 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1948).
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grounds to believe that a claim would be made against him."
Illinois admits independent statements of fact made during negotiations, reasoning that no protection should be afforded to matters
which are not in dispute." Admitting such statements, however,
produces several undesirable results. It hinders communication between the parties because they must be extremely cautious to avoid
making an admission which could later be used against them.2
Litigation is prolonged as attorneys sift through compromise negotiations in the hope of finding an admission which could be used
against the opposing party.93 Moreover, admitting such evidence
serves as a trap for persons who are unaware that their statements
are unprotected unless made "without recourse."94 It also decreases
the predictability of outcome since it is difficult to predict whether
a court will characterize a statement as an independent admission
or as an integral part of a compromise offer.5 Consequently, the
admission of independent statements of fact is a major problem
under current law.
Alternatives
The rule excluding offers of compromise has a valid basis. Although persons particularily adverse to litigation might continue
settlement attempts in its absence, nothing indicates that this
would generally occur. Moreover, by broadly applying the rule and
recognizing few "exceptions" to it, Illinois courts have preserved its
integrity.
90. Hill v. Hiles, 309 Ill.
App. 321, 32 N.E.2d 933 (1942).
91. Smothers v. Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Co., 264 11. App. 488 (1932).
92. Tracy, Admissibility of Statements of Fact Made During Negotiation for
Compromise, 34 MICH. L. REv. 524, 529 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Tracy]. The only way
an offering party can effectively protect himself is to limit his remarks to the offer itself. If
he so much as indicates that he is sorry for what had happened, his statements will be
admissible against him. See Dertz v. Pasquina, 59 Ill. 2d 68, 319 N.E.2d 12 (1974) (offering
party's statement that she was sorry for what happened and would pay for damages to codefendant's car was no more than an "expression of regret" which could be introduced against
her).
93. Bell notes that "It is a common court room scene to find the attorneys busily engaged
in dissecting any settlement efforts of the parties in an attempt to locate a morsel of evidence." Bell, supra note 6, at 239.
94. Bell, supra note 6, at 256. See also Tracy, supra note 92, at 528-30.
95. WNSTEIN, supra note 5, § 408[03], at 21-22.
96. It might be expected that most people would avoid making an offer if it could be used
against them as an admission of liability, unless a very small amount were involved. Furthermore, unlike the situation under the repair rule, there do not appear to be any significant
pressures which would compel an individual to attempt a settlement in the absence of the
exclusionary rule. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the protection afforded by the
exclusion actually encourages individuals to settle out of court.
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The basic problem under current law lies in the fact that independent statements of fact made during negotiations may be used at
trial. Admitting such evidence frustrates the policy of encouraging
out of court settlements because it hinders communication and decreases the predictability of outcome. Expanding the exclusion to
cover independent statements of fact might deprive the trier of fact
of relevant information in some situations, but it would also remove
a substantial deterrent to candid negotiation and thereby promote
the policy of encouraging settlements. Consequently, the rule
should probably be expanded to cover such statements. The federal
rules of evidence have already accomplished this expansion. The
expansion, however, should be broader than that of the federal
rules, for it should extend not only to statements made in conjunction with an offer of compromise but also to those made with reference to an offer to pay medical expenses." To differentiate between
the two situations creates a danger of inconsistent results, since
courts could characterize similar conduct in different ways."
CONCLUSION

Evidence of post-accident repairs and offers of compromise are
generally excluded to promote the policies of encouraging repairs
and out-of-court settlements. The compromise rule, which is
broadly applied and subject to few exceptions, represents a valid
means of promoting public policy. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of
97.

FED. R. EviD. 408 provides:
Compromise and Offers to Compromise. Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiatons is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the
exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion when
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution. (Emphasis added.)
Proposed Illinois Rule of Evid 408 adopted the broad approach displayed by the federal
rule. In fact, the proposed Illinois rule was virtually identical to the federal rule except for
the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Evidence deleted the language contained in the last sentence of the federal rule which was considered "unnecessary."
PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 408, Advisory Comm. Notes.
It should be noted that under the federal and proposed Illinois rules, independent statements of fact which are made during negotiations but which are "otherwise discoverable"
would be admissible at trial. This limitation on the exclusion of independent statements of
facts is desirable since it prevents an offensive use of the rule.
98. See note 66, supra.
99. See note 65, supra.
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the rule would be enhanced if the rule were expanded to cover independent statements of fact made during compromise negotiations.
The repair rule is a striking contrast to the rule excluding offers
of compromise. Whatever protection the repair rule provided in the
past has been substantially eroded by a series of increasingly
broader exceptions. Moreover, a variety of factors indicate that the
rule is unnecessary to encourage individuals to make repairs. It is
time to acknowledge that the rule no longer serves a valid purpose
by completely eliminating the rule itself.
RON DUPLACK

